The Center & Clark Newsletter On
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UCLA
Center for 17th- & 18th-Century Studies
William Andrews Clark
Memorial Library
From Newsletter no. 41, Spring 2003:
Bruce Whiteman
& Massimo Ciavolella, Pietro Aretino Collection Acquired
Bruce Whiteman ,
Pierre Louÿs (18701925)
Research Reports:
Allan Tulchin, Massacre at Michaelmas, 1567
Laura Schattschneider, Propriety and Convenance:
Smith and de Grouchy
Colleen Terrell, An Experimental Philosophy in America
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Return to the listing of contents (no. 41).
When Oscar Wilde published his play Salomé in 1893, he dedicated
it to his friend Pierre Louÿs, a young French poet and writer who would
later regret his friendship with Wilde, out of an odd moral scruple—odd,
given the risqué character of a good deal of Louÿs’s own work—and break
off all relations. Wilde was in Paris in 1891, and Louÿs was one of
the young idolizers who was often in his company, along with Marcel
Schwob and André Gide. Wilde inscribed a copy of his collection of stories
The House of Pomegranates to Louÿs very elaborately (“Au jeune
homme qui adore la Beauté/Au jeune homme que la Beauté adore/Au jeune
homme que j’adore), and he valued Louÿs’s advice deeply enough to ask
him to review the French text of Salomé. (William Andrews Clark Jr.
acquired Louÿs’s own copy of a rare trial edition of the play in 1932.)
Return to the listing of contents (no. 41).For this issue, essays were contributed by participants of three separate yearlong series: I.
Braudel Revisited: The Mediterranean World, 16001800 I.
Braudel Revisited: The Mediterranean World, 16001800 Massacre
at Michaelmas, 1567 On September 30, 1567, in Nîmes, in the south of France, members of the Protestant community rose up against the town’s Catholic regime. Crying “Kill, kill the papists” [all translations in this essay are the author’s], they arrested leading Catholics, laymen and priests, and then massacred many of them in cold blood, up to eighty according to one estimate. This event, known as the Michelade, from its proximity to Michaelmas, September 29, is far less well-known than the St. Bartholomew’s Massacre and other occasions when Catholics attacked Protestants in sixteenth-century France. Nonetheless, the Michelade is a good example of how people in the sixteenth century could be led to commit horrifying violence when political rivalry was inflamed by religious conflict. Nîmes in the sixteenth century was a town of about 10,000 people, already famed for its Roman antiquities, and an important administrative center in the region of Bas-Languedoc. It was the seat of an ancient bishopric, and the town’s chateau had a small garrison of royal troops. Its economy depended on four main sectors: agriculture, textiles and leather, trade, and government. Many people worked the fields outside of town; a large number were also occupied in transforming wool and cattle, the products of the Cévennes Mountains, northwest of town, into cloth and leather. The most important people in Nîmes, however, earned their living from government. The town had a presidial court, established in 1552 by King Henri II. Its judges were the most prestigious people in town. Both Catholic and learned in the law, they could not be removed because they had purchased their offices from the crown. The other main local institution, also dominated by lawyers, was the town council, headed by four consuls. The events that led immediately to the Michelade occurred against a background of several years of suffering brought on by failed crops, famines, and the financial burdens imposed on the town by the French king’s war against the Hapsburgs. The capacities of Nîmes’s council and court were seriously stretched by these challenges, but the breaking point came only after the arrival in late 1559 of Guillaume Mauget, the town’s first resident Protestant preacher. His presence unleashed Protestant sympathies and large numbers of townspeople began converting. Until that time, Nîmes had been solidly Catholic. Its few Protestants, concentrated among the ranks of the merchants and clothmakers, had been intimidated by the threat of prosecution for heresy and thus presented no danger to the town’s governing elite. All this changed with the dramatic rise in conversions to Protestantism. Starting in 1560 and 1561, the new “heresy” began to infect even the town council and the presidial. With these conversions the town’s governing bodies became bitterly divided and effectively paralyzed, a situation that prevented the Catholic faction from intervening to slow the momentum towards apostasy. This situation emboldened the Protestants to organize mass meetings and to increase their public preaching. The movement’s success attracted one of the greatest Protestant preachers of the age, Pierre Viret, who visited the city in late 1561. By 1562, as civil war began to break out across the country between the two religions, an astonishing eighty percent of Nîmes’s population had converted to the new religion. The town’s remaining Catholics were concentrated in low-status occupations such as agriculture and the humbler artisan trades, and thus were marginalized within the new structure of power. Despite this, during the 1560s, the crown, which remained Catholic, repeatedly interfered in local elections to keep Catholics in office. Angry Protestants wanted to drive a stake through the stubbornly quivering corpse of Catholicism. On September 30, 1567, the second day of Nîmes’s annual fair, this pent-up rage finally exploded. But the violence was highly organized. Protestant troops formed into regular companies and began to march about the city in an effort to frighten the Catholic community. As they marched they shouted, and their slogans were crude but effective. Jeanne Auberte, the wife of Jean Valat, a merchant, reported that she pulled her children indoors because she heard a “great noise and tumult” from the street. When she went out she saw armed men heading up the street shouting, “Close the shops!” Other witnesses heard the troops crying, “To arms! To Battle,” “Kill! Kill! Kill the papists,” and, in an apparent reference to the Glory Days that would follow a Protestant victory, “Kill, kill! New World, New World!” However, most witnesses, admittedly all hostile and therefore perhaps prone to see wickedness in the actions of the Protestant insurgents, stressed the troops’ rage, not their religious fervor. Having managed to wrest control of the keys to the town gates from the Catholic consuls to whom they were normally entrusted, the troops began rounding up prominent Catholics. The leaders of the Protestants, rapidly dubbed Messieurs by the people, had apparently prepared a list of victims ahead of time, which included many of the few remaining high-status Catholic men still in town, especially lawyers, priests, and officials. The first consul, Guy Rochette, was among those first taken, along with his half-brother Robert Gregoire. Rochette took refuge with his stepfather, Jean Gregoire. When Protestant troops showed up at the door demanding admission, Rochette’s mother lied and insisted that he was not there. Rochette, accompanied by his half-brother, then left the house, hoping to use his authority to restore order. Instead, his house was ransacked, and he and his brother were arrested. They were escorted first to the house of Guillaumes l’Hermite, a merchant and one of the leaders of the conspiracy, and then to the basement of the city hall. Apparently, this basement had a sinister reputation, since it was used as an abattoir to butcher animals for the sick during Lent. Rochette and Gregoire were not killed there, however. They, and the other victims, were taken to the courtyard of the bishop’s palace, where they were either stabbed or shot, and thrown down the bishop’s well. Despite the horror of this episode, most Catholics in Nîmes were spared. Even many of the Catholic lawyers were eventually released. Protestant rage was reserved for priests, and for the Catholic members of the council and courts, whose presence in the governing bodies had been forced on the now-Protestant town by the Catholic French king. The Messieurs, the leaders of the Protestants, included most of the members of the presidial. The evidence provided by the identity of the victims shows that the Protestant leaders were determined not only to take control of the town but also to remove any potential Catholic challenge to their power. The Michelade, therefore, was not a riot: it was a coup d’état. Return to the listing of contents (no. 41).II.
Nations and Identities: Between Culture and State Propriety
and Convenance:
Smith and de Grouchy Sympathy, the idea that emotions can be shared, was central to French and Scottish explanations of community in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The influence that these two schools of thought had on one another has made me curious about how theories of sympathy were translated from 1760 to 1800. How were ideas about the communicability of sentiment affected by their own modes of communication? With this question in mind, I have begun to examine closely the Clark Library’s copy of Théorie des sentiments moraux (1798), a translation by Sophie de Grouchy of the seventh (1792) edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. De Grouchy, wife of the marquis de Condorcet (the Girondin philosophe, political economist, and victim of revolutionary terror), began work on her translation in the early 1790s, but her precarious situation under the Jacobin regime prevented timely publication of her text. Included with de Grouchy’s translation were eight letters of her own, more a collection of musings on sympathy than a fully constructed system like Smith’s. Smith depends heavily upon the Stoic idea of self-possession and displacement from one’s own desire to show how sympathy curbs rampant self-interest: he argues that in order to function effectively in society we must see ourselves and our actions from the perspective of a dispassionate “impartial spectator.” That is, we must sense the inconsequence of our individual desires and cede them to the greater good. The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ “impartial spectator” was key to Smith’s social thought: it secured the equitable operation of the Wealth of Nations’ “invisible hand.” De Grouchy’s conclusions about what constitutes a just society do not differ much from Smith’s, but she makes no mention of an “impartial spectator.” Instead, she proposes that our natural capacity to feel for others in individual moments is extrapolated into a general principle whereby we seek the satisfaction of acting benevolently and avoid remorse for committing acts of injustice. General moral principles thus originate, for de Grouchy, in individual experiences. The most important of these experiences for her is an idealized form of romantic love, which, as she puts it, “attache plus de prix à la possession qu’à la jouissance” [places a greater value on possession than upon enjoyment]—a love founded upon reciprocal sympathy, in which each lover is invested in the other’s happiness. Indeed, she criticizes Smith for not recognizing love’s enlightening power and for focusing only on the ways love blinds us to the general good, ways she herself ascribes to love’s perversion by inequitable laws and institutions. Whereas in Smith’s version of sympathy, we must detach ourselves from our most passionate attachments in order to act justly, for de Grouchy, our most passionate attachments, bien dirigé, will lead us to universal sympathy. Thus, like all the human rights de Grouchy considers to be fundamental, possession, if protected by reason and equitable law, will make us more inclined to respect the possessions of others. This way of seeing one’s property (and personal attachments) is de Grouchy’s variation upon Smith’s famous modification of the golden rule, “love ourselves only as we love our neighbor”: for her, it is something more like “love our neighbor’s rights because we have learned to value our own.” Given these differences between Smith’s and Sophie de Grouchy’s discussions of sympathy, I was struck by a problem that de Grouchy must have faced in translating the word propriety. A central concept for Smith, propriety is defined in the Theory of Moral Sentiments as the “suitable or proportionate connection between an emotion and the object or circumstances that cause it.” The propriety of a word or behavior (especially when these are used to express our emotions in a given situation) may only be ascertained from the standpoint of the “impartial observer.” To act with propriety, therefore, we must pretend we do not care about the things in which we are most interested. Smith here seems to be working with the word’s rhetorical meanings, in which propriety is an element of decorum. Indeed, the “impartial spectator” comes into being in Smith’s text shortly before this definition of propriety, in a discussion of dispassionate aesthetic taste. Smith was writing during a period in which the meaning of the term propriety appears to have been shifting, and I have started to wonder to what extent his discussion contributed to this change. The term is derived from the Latin proprietatem, also the root of the English property. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, propriety clearly referred to property, as well as to proper speech: Samuel Johnson, for example, defined the term in 1755 in both the proprietary and rhetorical senses, as “exclusive right” and “accuracy; justness.” By the late eighteenth century, however, a new definition appears: the Oxford English Dictionary cites the first known instance of our modern, etiquette-driven sense of the word in Frances Burney’s Cecilia (1782). Smith, writing in the interim, seems to be drawing upon a colloquial meaning that Johnson did not record, in which propriety denotes “appropriate behavior,” especially when he discusses the extent to which one might voice complaints of physical or mental suffering and still retain the sympathy of one’s interlocutors. However, even if the proprietary senses of propriety faded away in part because of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, were they completely forgotten by readers of Smith’s Wealth of Nations? The French cognate to propriety, propriété, shares the rhetorical senses of the English term: entries in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française dating back to 1692 include the meaning “propre sens de chaque mot” [each word’s proper meaning]. However, the eighteenth-century French term primarily references property, and its meaning never encompasses the behavioral sense of the English cognate. De Grouchy must therefore use the word convenance in translating Smith’s propriety, although she occasionally resorts to propriété in what appears to be a kind of inadvertent anglicism. Convenance from 1694 does denote the behavioral definitions of propriety. It is derived from the Latin root convenientia, which also bestows “convenience” upon the English language, and which is a Latin term for rhetorical decorum used by Horace in the Ars poetica. Neither the root nor its derivative contains the semantic overtones of property and self-possession that buzz about the term propriety. Instead, the semantic nuance of convenance is confined to that which is simply, naturally, “fitting.” It is thus a term much better suited to de Grouchy’s descriptions of romantic love, in which two individuals are bound by a kind of reciprocal self-possession. Thus, although de Grouchy supported Smith’s liberal ideal of individual property rights, her translation of propriety as convenance recalibrates the resonances of property rights that accompany propriety to better fit the domestic, private sphere of sentimental attachment. At the same time, Smith’s use of the term seems a bridge to its newer meanings, in which its sphere is confined to the decorum of the drawing room. This semantic shift occurs during a period in which the issue of property rights divided republicans on both sides of the Channel. As I continue to investigate the circulations of sympathy and its translations in Scotland, France, and America, I will keep pondering what gets lost when propriety loses its connection to property rights, and when propriety becomes convenance. I welcome any light members of the Clark community might be able to shed on my investigations. Return to the listing of contents (no. 41).III. Nations and Identities: Knowledges and Technologies (UCLA Humanities Consortium, 200203) An
Experimental Philosophy in Early America My current book project, “Nation ex Machina: The Politics and Mechanics of New World Creation,” originates in the assumption that it is not a coincidence that so many of colonial America’s intellectual elite were simultaneously engaged in the production of both a new nation and new machines. Mechanics provided not only what we might call, following historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick in The Age of Federalism (1993), a “grammar” of nation building—that is, a common conceptual apparatus for describing the theoretical and material challenges of national founding—but also, through its compelling description of a clockwork universe fabricated by a Divine Maker, a model of artisanal creation ripe for emulation. Eighteenth-century Americans shared with their English counterparts a mechanistic worldview inaugurated by the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution. That the dissemination of this philosophical framework took place on both sides of the Atlantic is evident from surviving catalogues of books owned by colonial educational institutions such as Harvard and Princeton, as well as those owned by individuals like Jefferson, whose personal library became the founding collection of the Library of Congress. Copies of many of these books can be found now in the Clark’s holdings, and their contents help establish the tenor and pervasiveness of the mechanistic perspective with which the colonists would have been familiar. The emerging field of physical mechanics, as exemplified by Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), involved the application of pure mathematics to analyses of force, motion, and equilibrium. These analytical techniques proved useful in a variety of investigations, as natural philosophers sought mechanical explanations—often codified in elegant, quantifiable formulae—for everything from the motions of planets, pendulums, and projectiles to the behavior of static fluids, the reflection and refraction of light, or the circulation of the blood. In essence, mechanical (or “corpuscular”) philosophy provided an abstract method for analyzing the chains of cause-and-effect relations that governed the behavior of natural phenomena. As John Harris explained in the entry for “Mechanical Philosophy” in his Lexicon Technicum: or, An Universal English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1704), “it is the chief End, Design, and Business of natural Philosophy to consider Effects; and by reasoning upon them and their various Phaenomena, to proceed regularly at last to the Causes of Things; and especially to the Knowledge of the First Cause.” Harris’s reference to a “First Cause” suggests how the immutable natural laws governing physical matter offered one proof of a divine intelligence underlying their conception. As William Wollaston put it in The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722)—an edition of which Franklin helped typeset while working in a London printing house—“the astonishing magnificence” of the “frame and constitution of the world” shows beyond a doubt “that there is some Almighty designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things.” This was the divine being whom Jefferson called the “fabricator of all things from matter and motion,” a deity who created the Newtonian “System of the World” just as sublunary artisans crafted clocks and other machines.
This complementary, reciprocal method of analysis and synthesis—what Roger Cotes, in his preface to Andrew Motte’s English translation of the Principia (1729), called the “incomparably best way of philosophizing”—became a hallmark of Enlightenment reason. It offered more than a way to understand the natural world; as a formal analytical tool it could be applied repeatedly to empirical information of all kinds, from physics and mathematics to politics and history. Within this broad methodological compass, it was possible for eighteenth-century thinkers to reason analytically about the cause-and-effect relations at work in the “machinery” of society and government just as they reasoned about the more concrete motions of matter in the most efficient ploughs. Thus one finds Franklin constructing a model of civic virtue in the same mechanical terms with which he might have discussed his three-wheel clock; Adams describing “this complication of machinery, all these wheels within wheels” that constituted the elaborate system of political checks and balances built into the Constitution; Jefferson comparing America to “a new creation . . . made on an improved plan.” In fact one can find a host of similar images throughout the literature of early America, images that suggestively describe the diverse tasks of “forging” the union—its landscape, citizenry, and revolutionary republican government as well as its literary narratives—in the language of mechanical invention. Steeped in the theories and methods of contemporary Anglo-American science, America’s Founding Fathers pursued the challenge of creating new social and political structures in the New World as though it were a question, as Adams might have said, of “Mechanical Genius”—of finding the best system for the purpose. Return to the listing of contents (no. 41).Illustrations are identified in order of appearance. When not otherwise credited, images are from materials in the Clark Library collection. All rights are reserved. Portrait of Pietro Aretino from Talanta Comedia, di Messer Pietro Aretino (1542). Pietro
Aretino, I Sette salmi della penitentia di
David (1535). From Pierre
Louÿs’s Les aventures du roi Pausole (Paris, 1948). Benjamin Franklin’s three-wheel clock, in James Ferguson, Select Mechanical Exercises, 2d ed. (London, 1778). A water mill, in J. T. Desaguliers, A Course of Experimental Philosophy, vol. 2, 2d ed. (London, 1745).
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