201, Plato
Kelsey

Phil 201. A leisurely exploration of Plato’s Republic, sometimes w/reference to discussions of related topics in Aristotle. Useful secondary reading is Plato: Political Philosophy, by Malcolm Schofield.

220, History of Philosophy
Copenhaver, Normore, Parsons

The seminar on argument in Spring Quarter will be a continuation of the seminar on the same topic in Winter Quarter, but students in the Spring Quarter seminar need not have taken the Winter Quarter seminar.

The Spring Quarter seminar will focus on two texts, the Little Logic of Paul of Venice and the Dialectical Disputations of Lorenzo Valla, both written between 1400 and 1450, more or less. Paul's Little Logic was the leading logic manual of its day; Valla's Dialectical Disputations is an attack on the approach to logic and language represented by Paul's Little Logic. Although Valla plainly opposed Paul¹s way of doing things, the opponents that he actually names are far older: Boethius, Porphyry and Aristotle. On the surface, the target of Valla's Dialectical Disputations is the "Old Logic" of Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius that was current in Western Europe before the twelfth century: accordingly, the seminar will give some attention to the Old Logic. A prominent question will be: who was Valla actually attacking in the Dialectical Disputations?

We will read Paul's Little Logic in the English translation by Alan Perreiah, focusing on the first tractate, which summarizes the core notions developed in more detail in the rest of the work: terms, propositions and arguments. We may also spend some time on the third and fifth tractates, which deal with consequences and obligations. Since there is no published translation of Valla¹s Dialectical Disputations, we will use the draft English version by Copenhaver.

If time permits and interest emerges, we may move on from the fifteenth cenury to a very different approach to logic and argument in the seventeenth century; the Port Royal Logic.

Students enrolled for a letter grade will write a course paper.

255, Aesthetic Theory
Bodei

Aesthetics of Wildness.
Sublime landscapes in philosophy and literature:
Mountains, oceans, volcanoes, deserts.

There are places that most of humanity has avoided for millennia and that have prompted fear and dismay: mountains, oceans, volcanoes, and deserts. Inhospitable, hostile, and desolate, they conjure up death. The vastness of these places is humbling, their power threatening, and they remind everyone of his or her temporary and precarious existence in the world.
Nonetheless, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, such horrible places begin to be visited intentionally and are seen as “sublime” – endowed with a deep and enthralling beauty. This radical inversion of taste has more than merely an aesthetic relevance: it implies a new way of forging and consolidating individuality, thanks to the challenge arising from the greatness and predominance of nature. This confrontation gives rise to an unexpected mixture of pleasure and terror that, in an ambiguous way, reinforces the idea of humanity’s intellectual and moral superiority over the entire universe at the same time that it contributes to the discovery of the delight of losing oneself in the whole.
After having reached the zenith, the theories and the sensation of the sublime start their decline as the balance of forces seems to be upset when western humanity believes it has begun to defeat nature’s fearful immensity, reveal its hidden secrets, and suppress its rebellious energies. The sublime increasingly shifts thus from nature to history and from history to politics.
Although technological developments, the diffusion of mass tourism, and the destruction of the landscape have blunted the sentiment of the sublime by stripping it of those essential ingredients of uncertainty and fear, there are today factors that foster its revival. In fact, the hegemony of technology has made the struggle against a wounded and offended nature seem pathetic or wicked. Moreover, after the first interplanetary expeditions punctured the protective shell of the earthly biosphere, sidereal space opened up new frontiers of the sublime for humanity.

Required readings:
Longinus’ on the sublime. Edited with introd. and commentary by D.A. Russell, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964.
Edmund Burke, A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990.
Immanuel Kant, Critics of Judgement, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, §§ 23-28.
Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994.
Harold Bloom, Agon: Toward a Theory of Revisionism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Suggested reading for the preparation of papers:

Literary Texts:
Percy Bysshe B. Shelley, Mont Blanc (any complete edition).
Jules Michelet, The Sea. New York, Follet & Forster, 1864.
Pierre Loti, The desert [1898], Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1993.
Paul Bowles, The sheltering sky [1949], New York, Vintage Books, 1990.
M. Ondaatje, The English Patient, New York, Knopf, 1992
Susan Sontag, The volcano lover: a romance, New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1992.

Texts of aesthetics and general philosophy:
Blaise Pascal, Pensées and other writings, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Samul Holton Monk, The sublime: a study of critical theories in XVIII-century England, New York, Modern language association of America, 1935.
W.H. Auden, The Enchafed Flood, Or Romantic Iconography of the Sea, London, Faber & Faber, 1951.
Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain gloom and mountain glory, New York, Norton, [1963, c1959]
Thomas Weiskel, The romantic sublime: studies in the structure and psychology of transcendence , Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Christopher Thacker, The Wildness Pleases, London & Camberra-New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1983
Andrew Wilton, Turner and the Sublime, London, British Museum Publications, 1984.
Elizabeth R. McKinsey. Niagara Falls. Ikon of the American Sublime, New York – Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Matthew Cannon Brennan, Wordsworth, Turner, and romantic landscape : a study of the traditions of the picturesque and the sublime , Columbia, S. C., Camden House, 1987.
Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.
Frances Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime. Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation, New York, Routledge, 1992.
Tom Furniss, Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology. Language, Gender, and Political Economy in Revolution,Cambridge, 1993.
Of the sublime: presence in question. Essays by Jean-François Courtine [et al.] ; translated and with an afterword by Jeffrey S. Librett. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1993.
Simon Shama, Landscape and Memory, New York, Knopf, 1995.
Michael J. Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate 1750-1900. The Idea of Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell, New York – Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Sanford Budick, The Western Theory of Tradition. Terms and paradigms of the Cultural Sublime, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2000.
Lawrence Carl Kerslake, Essays on the sublime: analyses of French writings on the sublime from Boileau to La Harpe / Bern ; New York: P. Lang, 2000.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On the sublime, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
James Kirwan, Sublimity : the non-rational and the irrational in the history of aesthetics, New York, Routledge, 2005.

Remo Bodei
Professor of Philosophy
bodei@humnet.ucla.edu
340C Royce Hall
Phone number: (310) 206-1351.

287, Philosophy of Language
Cumming

The seminar will be on attitude reports. Below is a tentative schedule:

De Re
Week 1
Quine, Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes
Kaplan, Quantifying In

Paderewski
Week 2
Kripke, A Puzzle about Belief

Hob-Nob
Week 3
Geach, Intentional Identity
Edelberg, A New Puzzle of Intentional Identity

Week 4
Heim, The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite NPs

Week 5-6
van Rooy, Anaphoric Relations Across Attitude Contexts
Kamp, Prolegomena to a Structural Account of Belief and Other Attitudes

Paderewski and De Dicto
Week 7
Fine, Semantic Relationism

Paderewski and Hob-Nob
Week 8

De Re (again)
Week 9

Conclusion
Week 10

200B  SEM-FIRST YR GRADS     
LAWRENCE, G.

220   SEM-HIST-PHIL   
COPENHAVER, B./ NORMORE, C./ PARSONS, T

This is a seminar on the Theory of Argumentation and its History. We will begin with discussion of the very concept of argument, proceed to a discussion of fallacies and then go on to a discussion of codified forms of argument and disputation. Our aim is a better understanding of the nature and function of argument, its relation to such concepts as deduction and inference and its role in reasoning.
We will begin with a discussion of Parsons' paper "What is an Argument" (J. Phil 1996) and C.L. Hamblin's chapter " The Concept of Argument" from his book Fallacies. We will look at some recent discussions of the function of argument ­ including Robert Nozick¹s. We will then take up the discussion of fallacies, working our way through parts of Aristotle¹s discussion of Fallacies in his Sophistical Refutations, through Locke¹s treatment of fallacies and through some of the subsequent discussions of each. Some deductively sound arguments are traditionally treated as fallacies and we will discuss why and consider (and reconsider) some of the relations broached in between good argument and valid consequence.
In the latter part of the term we will turn to the theory and practice of disputation. We will discuss Hamblin¹s chapter ³Formal Dialectic² (from
Fallacies) and the medieval formalized disputation technique called ³Obligatio². If time permits we will consider some recent efforts to formalize argument and disputation. Although listed as a history seminar, the seminar may count for E&M, depending on paper topic.

241   TPCS-POLITCL PHILOS   
JULIUS, A.J.

M256  TOPICS-LEGAL PHILOS   
SHIFFRIN, S.

281   SEMINAR-PHILOS-MIND   
GREENBERG, M.D.

The Nature and Methodology of Philosophy

The seminar is officially listed as Philosophy of Mind 281, but the subject matter will cut across several areas, including metaphysics, 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. We will undertake a close examination of Timothy Williamson’s new book, 
The Philosophy of Philosophy.  The book has not yet been published, but is available on the internet at the following URL:
          http://web.princeton.edu/sites/philosph/williamson_book.pdf
It is slated to be published soon and will then be ordered for the ASUCLA store.

We will use The Philosophy of Philosophy as a springboard for discussion of several issues concerning the nature of philosophy and its methods. 
Topics to be discussed include: whether philosophy has a distinctive method; whether philosophical knowledge is a priori; the relation between 
empirical work and philosophy; whether philosophical truths are conceptual truths; the nature of conceptual truth; what is involved in giving a 
constitutive account of a phenomenon; the source of our knowledge of  necessity and possibility.

Depending on how the seminar goes, we may turn to other contemporary readings, including work by the instructor.

The seminar will meet on Mondays at 3:00. The first meeting will be introductory. There is no reading assignment for the first reading. 
          
Anyone who takes the seminar for a letter grade will be expected to attend regularly and to write a seminar paper on a topic of his or her 
choice. S/U students and auditors are also welcome.  You are welcome to attend the first meeting (or indeed several meetings) 
in order to decide whether you are interested in coming regularly.

SEMINAR ON DONNELLAN 

In this seminar we will explore some of the seminal papers of Keith Donnellan, papers that raise fundamental questions in -- and sometimes indeed have set the agenda for -- the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. It is a virtue of Donnellan’s work that is accessible, non-technical, put in the plainest of language. Accordingly, these papers can serve newcomers as introductions to these areas. At the same time, the issues raised are so basic that a review of these papers can serve the initiated as an opportunity to revisit the fundamentals.

We will start with Donnellan’s classic paper, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” his introduction into the literature of the influential but contested distinction between referential and attributive definite descriptions. Next we will read his “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,” his non-descriptivist treatment of proper names. After that we will turn “Speaking of Nothing,” Donnellan’s treatment of empty names. Supplementary readings will be announced and put on the website. Time permitting we will proceed further, for example, to Donnellan’s “Rigid Designators and the Contigent  A Priori.”

288   SEM-WITTGENSTEIN      
HSU, A.